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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) U.C.A., the matter has been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
and this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Are the alleged promises made to the Plaintiffs that, " they would 
become members of the Church of the First Bom," "see Christ face to face," and "receive 
a "stewardship" of property based on their consecrations;" subject to adjudication by the 
courts, in light of the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971); and the Utah Supreme 
Court's ruling in Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 
(Utah 2001)? 
2. Are the alleged promises made to the Plaintiffs that, "they would 
become members of the Church of the First Bom," "see Christ face to face," and "receive 
a "stewardship" of property based on their consecrations," too illusory and indefinite to be 
enforceable? 
3. Is the alleged promise to convey real property in the future in violation 
of the Statute of Frauds? Are the allegations in the complaint sufficient to allege a breach 
of contract to convey property against each individual Defendant? 
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4. Is the alleged promise to provide support for life in violation of the 
Statute of Frauds? Are the allegations in the complaint sufficient to allege a breach of 
contract to support for life each individual Defendant? 
5. Since the Plaintiffs voluntarily "consecrated" money, goods and 
services to the Church for spiritual blessing, can they later make a claim for unjust 
enrichment, after leaving and/or being excommunicated from the Church? 
6. Since the money claimed by Hancock was freely given directly to 
Church members by her then husband, Douglas Jordan (since divorced) as he felt inspired, 
is Douglas Jordan an indispensable party to the action? 
7. Did the Plaintiffs sufficiently state a claim for Breach of Contract 
and/or Unjust Enrichment, as to each Plaintiff against each individual Defendant? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
The standard of review in considering the trial court's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss is the correctness standard with no deference left to the trial court. Hall v. Utah 
State Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001). 
PRESERVATION FOR REVIEW 
The Defendants' claims and defenses raised in this appeal were all previously 
raised before the trial court, in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
Support. (Rec. 1069-1085, See Addendum "B" hereto). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceedings 
This case was filed in April of 1998 and involves several claims made against 
1 nurch and some of its members, by the Plaintiffs, Kaziah Hancock and Cindy Stewart, 
who were former members of th> l 
the action was first filed. (Rec. 1-8). The claims involved alleged promises made to the 
Plaintiffs, i.e. that they would become members of the Church of the First Born, see Christ 
face to f;tec , jiul trivive ;i h\Ui\\.i <kli fi>" ol pi opals kneJ upon their "consecrations" and 
faithfulness to the Church (Rec. 1-8). 
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by the Defendants, relying on the church 
c ; ne defense as well as failure to state a claim with sufficient particularity. (Rec. 59-103) 
This Motion was denied as far as the chi in: • : h i t M 11 m11ciln"t*c11• but \ \ as pai tiallj granted as 
to the sufficiency and an Amended Compliant was filed. (Rec. 318-325). Hancock's 
husband at the time, Douglas Jordan, was the individual who actually "consecrated" the 
n-opi*. '. <ii .<*': * • . ... removed as a 
Plaintiff and was listed as a Defendant. (Rec. 318-325). Douglas Jordan and Kaziah 
Hancock also divorced and Hancock failed to make any claim for the "consecrated" money 
in lite limn* *• pioLYulmy (Siv llouu .iiiiull findings of Divorce, Addendum, Exhibit" 
A Motion was filed to dismiss Hancock's claims base 
proceeding. (Rec. 352-417). Douglas Jordan's deposition was taken and in his deposition 
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he stated that he freely gave the money to various Church members as he was inspired, the 
money was freely given "with no strings attached". (See Depo. pgs. 110-115, Addendum 
Exhibit "D") Douglas Jordan was removed as a Defendant. 
The matter was tried to a jury in January of 2002. A verdict was rendered 
against all the Defendants. (See Verdict, Rec. 836-886). The Defendants filed a Motion for 
New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 URCP (Rec. 1007-1023). The trail court could not enter 
judgment against the Defendants based upon the information provided at trial. The Motion 
for New Trail was granted by the court. (Rec. 1112-1114). 
After the court granted a new trial, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for leave to file 
a Second Amended Complaint. (Rec. 1058-1068). OnMarch 14,2003, the Defendants filed 
a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b) URCP. 
(Rec. 1069-1081). The court granted leave for Plaintiffs to file their Second Amended 
Complaint, without ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b). 
(Rec. 1248-1250). 
Phillip Savage was a member of the Church who was included as a Defendant 
in this action. Phillip Savage filed bankruptcy and Plaintiffs filed a claim in his bankruptcy 
proceeding based upon their complaint filed in this case. An evidentiary hearing was held 
in the Bankruptcy Court in March 2003. The Bankruptcy Court found that there were no 
agreements or contracts between the Plaintiffs and Phillip Savage, and if there were such 
promises, as alleged, they would be illusory and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 
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(Siv MH'IIIOI.IIHIIIIII I kx ismn liinl I Inlci hstimating Claims 4 and 7, pgs *_- A: In re: Phillip 
P. Savage, Bankruptcy No. 00-32966-J IP Addendi 
The Second Amended Complaint contains five causes of action. The First 
Cause of i Action is for Breach (•; * ^ ntract; the Second is for Fraud/Constructive Fraud/ 
Negligent Misrepr^ ; X 
Enrichment/Implied Contract; the Fourth is for Racketeering under Utah law; and the Fifth 
is for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm. (Rec. 1058-1068) (See Addendum, Exhibit 
This appeal deals with the court's ruling in An ist of 2003 «• I™** : - t 
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims, except for their Breach 
of Contract and Unjust Enrichment claims. (Rec. 1254-1260). In September 2003, the court 
entered its Order dismissing nil ol 'P'hiiililh' t'lmnri, rwr I 
Unjust Enrichment. (Rec. 1339-1341) (See Decision in Regards to Motion to Dismiss, 
Addendum, Exhibit "F" hereto). 
Aftei llm in I' . ihsinKs.il i it llu- m«i|oi ml \ \ A Plaintiffs' claims, Plaintiffs filed 
another Motion for Leave to Amend, in order to file a Third Amended Complaint, (Rec 
1319-1321). The Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract and Unjust 
f-nnu : ^c a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to Amend. (Rec. 1460-1462). 
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The Defendants also filed a Motion for Judgment of Costs and Attorneys Fees 
for successfully defending the Utah Racketeering claim, as provided under § 76-10-1605(8) 
U.C.A., with a Memorandum in Support. (Rec. 1481-1491) 
The Motion to Amend to file a third complaint was denied by the court. The 
court ruled that if it were granted, "it would require the fact finder to judge church doctrine, 
which is not allowed." The court further ruled that it alleges actions against Douglas Jordan, 
who is not a party to the action, and without Mr. Jordan, "complete relief cannot be 
afforded." (See Order on Motion to File Amended Complaint, Rec. 1511-1512, Addendum 
Exhibit "G" hereto). 
After the court denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, the parties agreed to 
continue the upcoming trial and the court certified as final, for purposes of appeal, its 
decision of August 7, 2003 (dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims, except for Breach of 
Contract and Unjust Enrichment); and its Order of October 16, 2003 (denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend for the third time). This Order was entered on November 12,2003. (Rec. 
1555-1557). 
On November 19, 2003, Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal, appealing 
the trial court's decision of August 7, 2003, denying the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Breach of 
Contract and Unjust Enrichment claims. (Rec. 1564-1566). The Plaintiffs filed a Cross-
Appeal on December 1,2003, appealing the court's decision of August 7,2003, dismissing 
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PLUMIM!1.' \ I.inn1 .iicl Ih nil > denial ol Plaintiffs" Motion to Amend for the third time. 
(Rec. 1567-1569). 
Statement of the Facts 
The ruling being appealed by the Defendants, in this case, is the trial court's 
ruling in August 20(H IJIIIIIM' IIMIIMIII I Liiiiilifh ilmiisfni Hieaiim nl i 'unli.n m m ml I liifip-t 
Enrichment, along with the other claims. The statement of facts, set forth below, are those 
facts relating to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claims for Breach of Contract and 
I ) njust Enri :hment5 as containe ill in the Sec ,... Amended Complaint. 
1. • The Plaintiffs claims dismissed h] the : :>i ii t's decisic n :)f \ ugust' / 
2003 are contained in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complain, which contains five causes 
of actio . . . , «ux ,>i ui..-K i- .v-i Breach of Contract; the Second is for 
Fraud/C n < ^ - i t r 1 ^- ' . * laudulent 
Conversion or alternatively Unjust Enrichment/Implied Contract; the Fourth is for 
Racketeering under Utah law; and the Fifth is for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm. 
2. In the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege in theit ' 
Claim for Breach of Contract, that they freely "consecrated" their money, goods and services 
ii"' i II 11" • «i I i ' I i i c vt 1 iai IJJ v I or promises that they would receive a "stewardship" of property, 
become a member of the Church of tht l 
(Second Amd. Comp., Add. Ex. "A", 1|s 9 & 10). 
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3. The Plaintiff, Cindy Stewart, was excommunicated from the Church in 
May of 1997; and Kaziah Hancock was asked to leave in August of 1997. The Plaintiffs 
claim that they never received a "stewardship" of any kind and never met Christ, face to 
face. (Second Amd. Comp., Add. Ex. "A", Tfs 11, 12 & 13). 
4. In Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action for Fraudulent Conversion or 
alternatively Unjust Enrichment, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have been unjustly 
enriched by receiving the money, services, or property "consecrated" by the Plaintiffs 
without providing equal value in return. (Second Amd. Comp., Add. Ex. "A", f^ 27). The 
Complaint, however, does not specifically allege how much each individual Defendant was 
unjustly enriched by the money, services or property "consecrated" by the Plaintiffs. 
5. After the Court granted a new trial, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to 
Amend to file a Second Amended Complaint, which was granted by the Court, (Rec 1248-
1250). 
6. The Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint under Rule 12(b), Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(b) URCP. (Rec. 1069-1081) 
7. The Court granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss as to all claims 
except the Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment claims. (Rec. 1339-1341). The Court 
denied Defendants' Motion as to there claims, by looking up the terms in the common 
dictionary and finding that "stewardship" is a noun and thus a thing. (See Decision in 
Request to Motion to Dismiss. Addendum, Exhibit "F") 
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Fourth Case 01 Action was for Racketeering under Utah 's 
Racketeering Statute. Thisclaim w;is dismissed h\ lln ln.il mil .IIMIIIH I  i 'Ih m h u t s ' filled 
a Motion for Judgment of Costs and Fees in having to defend this action, which is provided 
for under Section * 605(8) U.C \. 
9. i 
Amended Complaint finding that such amendment "would require the fact finder to judge 
church doctrine, which is not allowed;" and that without Mr. Jordan, "complete relief cannot 
be affoi ded "" (R ec 1511 151 2. Oi dei on Motion to File Amended Complaint, Addendum 
Exhibit "G") 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T 
The alleged promises that Plaintiffs, "would receive a "stewardship" of 
p r o " * . . irstborn, i 
"would see Christ face to face," all deal with Church doctrine and are not s u h u v * > 
adjudication by the courts. The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law 
n^TH : i.>.-.<:• . .. or prohibit the free exercise thereof. These two 
clauses known as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clai lse, limit go\ ernme lit 
activity in religious doctrine. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,29 L.Ed.2d. 745,91 S.Ct. 
2105 (19 ; 1). , Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 
2001 I I iiilIniiiiiHi liu Ihi IM i iilill'i I I i nw i .ill I llit ",< Ut'ssin^ llie\ mi l lu IIIHJIII 
true and faithful to the Church and its teachings, which they failed to do. One left the 
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Church and the other was excommunicated. Regardless, whether or not they remained true 
and faithful to the Church is a matter of Church doctrine, and is not for the courts to decide. 
Id. 
The promises allegedly made, if not religious in nature, are so illusory that 
they cannot be enforced. There is no written contract. No specific piece of real property or 
any other kind of property described. There is also no time frame specified for any of these 
alleged promises to occur. In fact, it was understood that the blessings and the 
"stewardship" would be provided by the Lord. A supposed promise is too illusory when its 
performance is entirely discretionary, or when it is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced 
with any certainty. Resource Management v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985). 
Lane v. WahL 6 P.3d 621 (Wash.App. 2000) (an "illusory promise" is one that is so 
indefinite that it cannot be enforced, or by its terms, makes performance optional or entirely 
discretionary on the part of the promisor). 
The Plaintiffs have alleged an oral promise to receive a "stewardship" of 
property. There is no writing to bind the parties to a contract to convey real property. The 
Statute of Frauds requires that a contract for the sale of, or for any interest in real property, 
exceeding a year, must be in writing. § 25-5-1 U.C.A. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 
948 P.2d 356 (Ut.App. 1997). Furthermore, as far as any claim for continuing support for 
life, the Statute of Frauds provides that any agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year is void, unless the agreement is in writing, signed by the party to 
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be charged. § 25-56-4 U.C.A. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately state a 
claim against each individual Defendant, who was not a party to any contract, and did not 
receive any benefit from the Plaintiffs. The Statute of Frauds requires a writing before any 
party is required to answer for the debt of another. § 25-5-4(2) U.C.A.; Automotive Mfgrs. 
Warehouse. Inc. v. Service Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
Furthermore, any money Hancock can claim was freely given directly to 
Church members by her then husband Douglas Jordan. (See Addendum, Exhibit "D"). The 
parties divorced and in the divorce proceeding there was no claim made by Hancock against 
Douglas Jordan for this money. (See Addendum, Exhibit "C"). Douglas Jordan was initially 
named as a Plaintiff, then was sued as a Defendant, and then was removed as a party before 
the case went to trial. In the Second Amended Complaint there is no allegation made on 
behalf of Douglas Jordan or against Douglas Jordan, who is the one who gave the money 
and claimed he did so of his own free will, with no strings attached, as he felt inspired by 
the Lord. Douglas Jordan is therefore an indispensable party to the claims asserted in the 
Second Amended Complaint. 
Moreover, since in the Second Amended Complaint, the money was 
"consecrated" to the Church based on certain promises and spiritual blessings such as a 
"stewardship" of property, being members of the Church of the Firstborn and seeing Christ, 
face to face, as alleged in Plaintiffs' claim for Breach of Contract; there can be no claim for 
unjust enrichment. Lynch v. Deasoness Medical Center. 776 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1989). These 
11 
allegations are totally inconsistent with any claim that the money was "consecrated" based 
on the agreement of any Defendant, that he would pay the Plaintiffs back for all their 
consecrations. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific contract which they 
entered into with any specific individual Defendant; and have failed to allege any specific 
benefit any individual Defendant has unjustly received from the Plaintiffs. Similarly to the 
Defendant, Phillip Savage, the Plaintiffs have improperly grouped all of the Defendants 
together without setting forth any specific claim for breach of contract or unjust enrichment 
against each Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS INVOLVE CHURCH DOCTRINE AND THE 
COURT CANNOT ADJUDICATE CHURCH DOCTRINE. 
The alleged promises made to Hancock and Stewart, that, "they would be 
members of the Church of the First Bom," "would see Christ face to face," and "would be 
provided a "stewardship" based on their "consecrations," all deal with Church doctrine 
which is not subject to adjudication by the courts. 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, provides that Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof. 
These two clauses known as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, limit 
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government activity in religious doctrine. Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 
745,91 S.Ct. 2105(1971). 
It is well settled in the federal courts and in the State of Utah, that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits judicial review and interpretation of church law, policies, 
or practices; and the determination of these claims is barred by the First Amendment. 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 21 .P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). Cf. Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); and Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94, 97 
(1952) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court states: Churches must have power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of 
faith and doctrine." Id. at 116. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lafferty stated: 
Men may believe what they cannot prove. Religious experiences which are 
as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Similarly due 
process considerations [under both the state and federal constitutions] bar 
courts from requiring defendants to prove the truth of their religious beliefs 
because they would have to prove the unprovable, an obvious unfairness of 
the most fundamental kind. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 
1988). 
The Breach of Contract claim deals with religious matters and church doctrine 
and policies such as "consecration," "stewardship," "Church of the Firstborn," "faith," 
"obedience," and "seeing Christ" (whether in visions or dreams). The Court cannot 
adjudicate these religious doctrines. For example, the court cannot find that the Church 
breached the law of "consecration" as taught by the Church. Such a ruling would require 
the adjudication of church doctrine. Furthermore, such a ruling would greatly interfere with 
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the teachings of all churches and organized religions as their teachings will become subject 
to review by the courts. Moreover, such a ruling will greatly inhibit the financing of such 
charitable organizations as they will no longer be able to accept charitable contributions for 
fear of being sued for breach of contract, fraud, or unjust enrichment by excommunicated 
members, over their teachings, beliefs, and religious doctrine. 
There can be no finding of breach of contract or unjust enrichment, without 
the court determining issues of "stewardship," "consecration," membership in the "Church 
of the Firstborn," and "seeing Christ face to face." The court would also need to determine 
the Plaintiffs' own faith and obedience to the Church's teaching, since these blessings would 
be based on their faithfulness, and they were either excommunicated or left the Church. The 
court simply cannot determine these religious issues. 
II. THE ALLEGED PROMISES MADE ARE TOO ILLUSORY TO BE 
ENFORCED. 
The promises allegedly made, even if not religious in nature, are so illusory 
that they still cannot be enforced. To be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see 
Christ face to face, and to receive a "stewardship" of property are all too indefinite to be 
enforced by a court of law. 
Furthermore, there is no specific property described or piece of real property 
identified to be enforceable; and there is no time period or time frame set forth for all of 
these blessings to occur. In fact, it was understood that the "stewardship" would be provided 
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by the Lord. In fact, the Plaintiffs may still receive all of these blessings at some point, if 
they repent, return to the Church, and remain faithful to its teachings. 
A supposed promise is illusory when it is so indefinite that it cannot be 
enforced without any certainty. Resource Management v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 
(Utah 1985). See also Wharf Restaurant Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.App. 
1979)(when its provisions are such as to make its performance entirely discretionary on the 
part of the alleged promissor, the promise is illusory and cannot be enforced); Goodpaster 
v. Pfizer, Inc.. 665 P.2d 414 (Wash.App. 1983)(promise is illusory when it is so indefinite 
that it cannot be enforced); Lane v. Wahl 6 P.3d 621 (Wash.App. 2000) (an "illusory 
promise" is one that is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced, or by its terms, makes 
performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promissor). The alleged 
promises in this case, to be a member of the Church of the Firstborn, to see Christ face to 
face, and to receive a "stewardship" of property, without any more description or time frame, 
are so indefinite and discretionary that they are illusory and unenforceable. Id. 
III. ANY ALLEGED PROMISE TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY IS 
UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Plaintiffs do not allege any written contract that would bind the 
Defendants to a contract for the sale or to provide interest in any real property. Under Utah 
law, the Statute of Frauds requires that a contract for the sale or for any interest in real 
property exceeding a year, must be in writing. §25-5-1 U.C.A. 
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Hancock claims that she had the understanding that land would be purchased 
for her by the Church in exchange for her husband's donations. However, the existence of 
a writing necessary to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, has not been alleged, nor does Hancock 
allege that such a writing ever existed. Furthermore, there is no writing alleged that provides 
any definite terms as required under general contract law for the sale of property. For 
instance, no writing is alleged containing any description of the real property to be 
conveyed, or clearly defining the parties to the contract, the consideration, or any certain 
time for the performance of the contract. As set forth above, the "stewardship" was actually 
conditioned on a future religious event, with no set time period, i.e., when the Lord provides 
it. Regardless, there is no writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
IV. ANY ALLEGED PROMISE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR LIFE IS 
UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Statute of Frauds also provides that any agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the making of the agreement, is void unless the 
agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged. §25-56-4 U.C.A. Therefore, the 
alleged verbal promises made to Plaintiffs that in return for their "consecrations" they would 
taken care of for life, or to provide support for life, are void and unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds. These claims should have been dismissed. 
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V. HANCOCK'S MONEY WAS FREELY GIVEN TO THE CHURCH AND 
OTHERS BY HER THEN HUSBAND, DOUGLAS JORDAN, MAKING 
DOUGLAS JORDAN, AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE ACTION. 
Douglas Jordan is the one who "consecrated" or gave any money to the Church 
or to various Church members. Douglas Jordan was originally included as a Plaintiff, 
without his consent; and then was removed and listed as a Defendant. The deposition of 
Dougal Jordan, now deceased was taken, and he testified that he freely gave the money to 
various Church members as he felt inspired, with no strings attached. 
Douglas Jordan and the Plaintiff, Hancock divorced. In their divorce 
proceedings, Hancock did not make any claim against her husband for the money that he 
freely gave to Church members. Thus, the money was not Hancock's premarital funds, and 
was Mr. Jordan's to give away as he desired. Therefore, Hancock waived any claim she may 
have to the money; and any claim based on the "consecration" of the money would be that 
of Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan would need to bring those claims; as the real party in interest, 
Mr. Jordan, is an indispensable party to this action. 
VI. ANY MONEY RECEIVED WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN TO THE 
CHURCH FOR SPIRITUAL BLESSINGS; THEREFORE THERE CAN 
BE NO CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a verbal contract and have elected 
to sue for breach of contract. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment should be 
dismissed. Recovery under unjust enrichment is available only when no contract exists. 
Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 19 P.3d 392 (Ut.App. 2001). 
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Furthermore, based on the alleged verbal agreement, the Plaintiffs have alleged 
that they "consecrated" their property to the Church, based upon certain promises of spiritual 
blessing, such as to receive a "stewardship" of property, be members of the Church of the 
Firstborn, and to see Christ face to face. Therefore, Plaintiffs' property was freely given 
without expecting any monetary compensation from the Defendants. Lynch v. Deasoness 
Medical Center, 776 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1989) (to establish unjust enrichment, plaintiff cannot 
be a volunteer). 
VII. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY STATE A CLAIM 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS INDIVIDUALLY, FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The Plaintiffs have also failed to allege what contract was entered into between 
each Plaintiff and each one of the Defendants, and how that Defendant breached the terms 
of any binding contract, just as they failed to do with Phillip Savage. Furthermore, the 
allegations in the Breach of Contract claim deal with religious matters that are not subject 
to adjudication in the courts. 
The Plaintiffs have also failed to allege what benefit each individual Defendant 
received, or how each individual Defendant was unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs' 
contributions. As with Phillip Savage, the Plaintiffs continue to improperly group all the 
Defendants together in their unjust enrichment claim. All of the Defendants could not have 
been unjustly enriched to the full amount of Plaintiffs' claims. For example, if Douglas 
Jordan gave, $3,000.00 to one Defendant to help repair a roof, all of the Defendants were 
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not unjustly enriched. The Plaintiffs have failed to properly state a claim for unjust 
enrichment; as to each Defendant, and cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment based on 
the facts alleged. Therefore, this claim should have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The alleged promises that Plaintiffs would receive a "stewardship" of property 
and support, would become members of the Church of the Firstborn, and would see Christ 
face to face, all deal with Church doctrine and are not subject to adjudication by the courts. 
Such a determination would interfere with religion and is prohibited by the First 
Amendment. 
The promises allegedly made, if not religious in nature, are so illusory that they 
cannot be enforced. There is no written contract. No specific piece of real property or any 
other kind of property described. There is also no time frame specified for any of these 
alleged promises to occur. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged an oral promise to receive a "stewardship" of 
property. There is no writing to bind the parties to a contract to convey real property. § 25-
5-1 U.C.A. Furthermore, any claim for continuing support for life, is in violation of the 
Statute of Frauds § 25-56-4 U.C.A. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any 
liability of each individual Defendant for breach of any contract in violation of the Statute 
of Frauds § 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. 
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Furthermore, any money Hancock can claim was freely given directly to 
Church members by her then husband Douglas Jordan. Hancock did not claim this money 
in their divorce; therefore, Douglas Jordan, the one who gave the money and claimed he did 
so of his own free will, "with no strings attached", as inspired by the Lord, is an 
indispensable party to the claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Moreover, since the money was "consecrated" to the Church based on certain 
promises and spiritual blessings such as a "stewardship" of property, being members of the 
"Church of the Firstborn," and "seeing Christ, face to face," as alleged in Plaintiffs' claim 
for Breach of Contract; there can be no claim for unjust enrichment. These allegations are 
totally inconsistent with any claim that the money was "consecrated" with the understanding 
of each Defendant, that he individually, would pay the Plaintiffs back for all their 
consecrations. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any specific contract which they 
entered into with the individual Defendants; and have failed to allege any specific benefit 
any individual Defendant has unjustly received from the Plaintiffs. Similar to the 
Defendant, Phillip Savage, the Defendants have been improperly grouped together without 
any specific claim against them for breach of contract or unjust enrichment. 
This Court needs to reverse the trial court's ruling denying Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment; and 
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remand the case back to the trial court, for the sole purpose to determine costs and fees 
incurred by the Defendants in successfully defending Plaintiffs' Utah Racketeering Claim. 
DATED this "7 day of July, 2004. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
Attorney for Respondent and Appellant 
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